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III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
A.

Whether or not the district

court abused its discretion

in not requiring defendants to answer plaintiff's
Set Number

3,

fully and with candor

as

required

Interrogatories,
by Rule

33(a),

URCP.
B.

Whether or not the court abused its discretion in failing

to strike

the

affidavit

of Dr.

Swinyer, defendants' expert,

who

expressed an opinion in support of defendants' motion for summary
judgment.
C.

Whether or not the court abused

its discretion in ruling

as a matter of law that there was no genuine issue of causation and
that the defendants were therefore entitled to summary judgment

in

their favor.

IV. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES.
See plaintiff's/appellant's principal brief.

V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE: As stated in plaintiff's/appellant's
principal brief.

VI.

RELEVANT FACTS

The following facts are stated to clarify and
defendants' statement
of facts. The numbering system
principal brief is continued.
S.

address
of the

Plaintiff used the iron until September, 1990, believing

all the time that any chemicals which might have been in the iron
at

the

time

of

the

incident

of

which

she

complained

had

been

eliminated by the "Before Use Cleaning" and by her initial use of

1

the iron.(Plaint iff's Deposition, Page 47, Lines 10-25), R. 0210.
Defendants did not tell plaintiff that those "chemical residues"
were really chemicals which had been designed into the iron, nor
did they advise plaintiff not to use the iron.
T.

Dr. Sotiriou stated that plaintiff/appe1lant "has a bad

case of contact dermatitis, I mean she is severe." Dr. Sotiriou's
Deposition, Page 57, Line 22.
U.

Neither Dr. Sotiriou nor Dr. Zone expected plaintiff to

undergo patch testing unless and until her skin was clear and she
was not using corticosteroids two prerequisites for satisfactory
patch testing. Deposition of Dr. Zone, Page 27, Lines 14-20. At no
time during

the

relevant period

to which defendants

refer

did

plaintiff meet the prerequisite conditions for patch testing. When
her skin was clear she was taking corticosteroids.
V. Dr. Lieferman diagnosed possible "T-cell lymphoma", a type
of

cancer.

Since

Dr.

Lieferman's

diagnosis

and

her

planned

treatment were so speculative, and since biopsies were negative(Dr.
Zone's

Deposition,

Exhibit

8,

pg

6,

lines

4-15,

plaintiff's

principal brief) and Dr. Zone's examination of plaintiff did not
confirm T-cel1 lymphoma,(pg 7, lines 4-25), plaintiff was justified
in declining to follow the doctor's advice.(Dr. Lieferman's letter
from

Mayo

Clinic

to Dr.

Sotiriou,

Exhibit

5,

of

Dr.

Zone's

deposition.) That plaintiff's skin condition cleared up since she
quit using defendants' iron

indicates the incorrectness of Dr.

Leiferman's diagnosis and demonstrates that plaintiff's decision

2

was correct.
W.
his

Dr. Zone was specifically asked, at Page 24, Line 22, of

deposition

whether

plaintiff's

problems

in

1989

were

"essentially the same" as those Dr. Reese described in 1983. Dr.
Zone's answer was, "It is impossivble for me to say, because I did
not see her in 1983."

VII.

See also: Stated Fact 16 at R. 0344

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A.

Plaintiff is not trying to "divert the court's attention"

by taking issue with the trial court's discovery rulings and the
adequacy of Dr. Swinyer's affidavit. Plaintiff

is directing the

court's attention to a series of serious errors, amounting to abuse
of judicial discretion, which have been made in the progress of
this case

and which

deserve

redress. Such

errors are

at

the

foundation of everything that has occurred so far in prosecuting
this

action,

and

defendants(Page

9

they

go

of

their

to

the

very

brief),

question

"whether

expressed

the

trial

by

court

properly entered summary judgment" based on the record of the case
which is not devoid of evidence supporting plaintiff's allegations
of causation and on an affidavit issued by an expert, incompetent
to testify with respect to causation, furnished by the defendants.
Plaintiff is asking the court to decide whether a family
of corporate defendants, doing business on an international scale
and

engaged

in

state

of

the

art

manufacturing,

in

foreign

countries, of appliances and tools which they expect to sell, and

3

do sell, in Utah and the rest of the United States, should be able
to control the outcome of a products liability case against them by
simply refusing to disclose information over which they have sole
and exclusive control when the information was requested
injured

plaintiff's

interrogatories,

to

which

in an

interrogatories

defendants' did not timely object.
B.

Further, the plaintiff is not denying that Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, Rule 56(e) calls for rebutting affidavits of the
non-moving party in response to a proper Summary Judgment motion,
but she questions whether defendants' Summary Judgment motion was
properly founded and claims consideration in view of the facts of
this case and by virtue of Rule 56(f). Plaintiff claims that the
fact that defendants/appellees' are the exclusive possessors and
controllers of evidence essential to the issue of causation in this
discovery phase of the prosecution of this case against them, gives
them virtually exclusive control of the case's progress. By simply
withholding

the

identities of

the chemical

products

defendants

selected as they designed the culprit "The Classic" metal iron and
as

they used

them

in the

iron's manufacture, defendants

have

thwarted any efforts at a scientific and technical evaluation of
plaintiff's allegations of causation by both the experts of the
plaintiff and of the defendants. The resolution of this case should
not be so controlled.
C.

Plaintiff does not

argue "that she bore no burden

to

present evidence in response to Black and Decker's motion". She is

4

saying that
defendants

if she could not
are

in

sole

and

meet

that burden, it was

exclusive

control

of

because

the

very

information she must have to develop her proofs. This is not a case
in which the ultimate fact at issue is simply not capable of proof.
The facts in the record bear this out, and her affidavit filed with
her brief in opposition to summary judgment support her claim. When
the court gives defendants the power to control the evidence, it
gives defendants the power to move for summary judgment at their
convenience.

If

the

safeguards

of

the

standards

by

which

interrogatories and affidavits are judged are ignored, the trial
court's summary judgment against the plaint iff/appe1lant does not
in fact resolve this case on the merits.

VIII. ARGUMENT
A.

JUDGE MOFFAT ABUSED HIS JUDICIAL DISCRETION WHEN HE FAILED
TO REQUIRE BLACK AND DECKER TO ANSWER PLAINTIFF'S
INTERROGATORIES, SET NUMBER 3, FULLY AND WITH CANDOR,
1.

Plaintiff

does

not

"question

the

trial

court's

authority", as suggested by defendants(Brief Pg. 18), to "manage"
discovery before, or after, the defendants

failed to object to

plaintiff's Interrogatories, Set Number 3. Defendants cite Utah
Road

Commission

v.

Petty,

Plaintiff argues that

412

the trial

P.2d

914

as

court

abused

their

authority.

its discretion by

failing to issue a ruling which directly settled the question of
whether or not the defendants were going to be required to produce

5

full

and

complete

answers

to

plaintiff's

Interrogatories,

Set

Number 3, (Petty, at 917, rt. col. lines 7-15), particularly when
defendants failed

to object

thereto and gave no reason for not

answering "f ul ly" (Rule 33, URCP) , (Petty, at pg. 916, rt. col, last
full sentence) did not claim privilege, (Petty at pg. 916, bottom
of rt. col., beginning with word "However" and continuing six lines
on page 917).
a. Trial Court's First Opportunity to Rule.
Opportunity for the court to rule on whether or
not defendants/appellees should be required to answer plaintiff's
Interrogatories, Set Number 3, fully and completely as required by
Utah

Rules

plaintiff's

of

Civil

Motion

Procedure,

for

More

Rule

33(a),

Complete

was

Answers,

given

R.

0225

with
and

supporting memo at R. 0209, in which plaintiff pointed out, in
detail, that

defendants' answers

"were incomplete, unclear

and

evasive'1, R. 0210, 18th line thru R. 0215, but the court's order
failed to rule on the issue directly. In fact the court granted
plaintiff's motion for more complete answers and thereby recognized
the requirement of the rule, R. 273, and at the same time made it
impossible for plaintiff to appeal the ruling. The court's order of
20 November

1991,

R.

0283,

however,

disregarded

all

of

the

arguments of plaintiff and failed to grant that which plaintiff was
seeking,

"full

and

complete

answers

to

her

interrogatories".

Plaintiff objected to the proposed order prepared by defendants, R.
0274, because its wording gave defendants license to give answers

6

which were not much more complete than their original answers, but
that is the order Judge Moffatt signed. The court gave no specific
reasons for such a ruling.
Had the court ruled directly against plaintiff
at that time, plaintiff could have appealed the ruling,

the issue

could have been resolved two years ago, and there would have been
no

further

need

for discussion

of

the problem, or

sanctions.

Defendants' brief, at pg. 21, mid page.
b. Trial Court's Second Opportunity to Rule:
A second opportunity

for the trial court to

directly rule on the issue was afforded when plaintiff challenged
defendants' compliance with the court's order of 20 November 1993,
with an objection, R. 0292 and R. 0294, and a motion for formal
compliance with the court's order. R. 0292. Plaint iff/appe1lant
therein recited her objections in specific detail, R. 0295-303, and
suggested a method of satisfying the objections, R. 0304.

The

court, although grudgingly, granted plaintiff's motion, R. 0354,
and

issued

its order, R. 0467, making

impossible.

But, even

with

an appeal

a knowledge

of

the

by

plaintiff

admission

of

defendants' counsel that defendants had not answered plaintiff's
interrogatories, Set Number 3, "fully and completely" (Counsel's
Letter to Judge Moffatt, dated 21 November 1991, R. 0286, at 0287
lower half of page.) The trial court did not require that which
plaintiff

was

seeking,

"full

and

complete

answers"

to

her

Interrogatories, Set Number 3. Again, had the court ruled directly

7

against

plaintiff/appe1lant

on

that

occasion,

she

could

have

appealed, and the issue would have been settled sixteen months ago,
c. Now, in this appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals is
being called upon by the plaintiff/appe1lant to decide whether or
not the trial court abused its discretion when it acted as it did
and whether the defendants should have been required to furnish
"full and complete" answers to plaintiff's

Interrogatories, Set

Number

objections

3,

in

the

absence

of

valid

to

the

interrogatories. Had defendants stated their objections with their
timely

answers,

immediately

and

those

objections

directly

by

the

could

trial

have

been

court with

resolved

considerable

economy of effort by all concerned. Petty, 412 P.2d at 917, rt.
col., 1ines 3-7.
2. Regarding defendants' suggestion that plaintiff's
interrogatories and her efforts to obtain complete answers are
"tricks to surprise the defendants'1.
a. Defendants/appellees suggest, by their selected
quotation from State Road Commission v. Petty, 412 P,2d 914, that
plaintiff

is employing

"tricks to surprise the opposition at a

critical moment", (Defendants' brief at page 18)

Surely filing

interrogatories, early in the commencement of this action,
not

fall

into

that

category. Besides, Set Number

3 could

does
not

surprise defendants, because they have known of plaintiff's need
for the information Set Number 3 seeks, and virtually all other
aspects of this case since 4 May 1988, some 19 months before this
lawsuit was filed. R. 0239; see also R. 0316.
8

Defendants further

suggest, by the quoted passage, that plaintiff has been sitting
idly by while defendants have prepared their case with zeal and
diligence and that with four simply stated interrogatories of Set
Number 3, plaintiff is asking for information, the acquisition of
which

involved defendants

in a great deal of

time, effort

and

expense in the preparation of their own defense case. Appellees
surely jest.
The

court

in

Pet ty,

as

quoted

in

defendants'/appe1 lees' brief at pg 18, was giving an example of a
situation

in

which

one

party

attempts

to

obtain

privileged

information collected by the other party in the course of the other
party's

own

plaintiff's
certain

discovery.
appeal

of

The
an

issue

order

interrogatories. Petty

in

Petty

requiring
states

arises

plaintiff

from
to

some appropriate

the

answer
general

principles for interpreting and applying the requirements of Rule
33, URCP. The passage appellees quoted, however, has no application
to the present case. The information sought by plaintiffs in her
interrogatories was generated by defendants/appellees in the normal
course of the defendants' business of designing, manufacturing and
distributing defendants' iron, not

in the preparation of

their

defense in this case. That plaintiff asked defendants to identify,
with

names

recognized

by

scientists,

technicians

and/or

the

suppliers trading with Black and Decker, the chemicals or chemical
products defendants have selected, and which they procure, to be
manufactured

into their

iron at only twelve locations, R. 0221-

9

0223, is not carrying discovery to the extreme so as to be unduly
burdensome to defendants.

3. With respect to defendants'/appellees' knowledge or
lack thereof of the components of their "The Classic" metal steam
iron.
a.
were

M

not

components

aware

Defendants, in their sophistry, say that they
of

the

supplied

by

assembly of the iron."

chemical
third

composition

of

party manufacturers

all

of

used

the

in

the

Note that plaintiff has never asked for

"the chemical compositions of all of the components supplied by
third party manufacturers used in the assembly of the iron." The
interrogatories do not ask for such information, neither has the
plaintiff

asked

for

such

information

interrogatories. She has asked

since

she

issued

her

only that defendants, using

the

language of science and/or of the technicians who procure and use
the chemical products in the manufacture of the iron, identify the
chemicals and/or the products used in the iron at only twelve sites
within the iron. Even if defendants "were not aware of the chemical
composition

of all

of

the

components

supplied

manufacturers used in the assembly of the iron"

by

third

party

they would have

known much more about those components than they profess, but in
any event they have admitted that they know more than they have
furnished. Counsel's letter. R. 0286, bottom half of page, and they
have not revealed that which they do know.

10

b. Defendants acknowledged that they knew(know) what
plaintiff's interrogatories asked when in their Memorandum in Reply
to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Protective Order they said, ". . ., what plaintiff really wants is
simply an identification of the chemicals used in the manufacture
of the iron." R. 0135, and as quoted at R. 0238, last paragraph.
How Refreshing!
c. Plaintiff has not asked defendants to "search out
new information" she has asked only that "information which it
already has" be furnished.

Plaintiff has demonstrated

time and

again that defendants have not complied with the spirit and intent
of rules 26 and 33, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. For one example,
see R. 0299-0303.

4. Regarding the respective situations and resources and
the lack of availability to the plaintiff of the information sought
by any other means. State Road Commission v. Petty, 412 P.2d 916,
at 918, Middle of Left Column.
It would be a financial and physical impossibility for
the plaint iff/appellant to determine the components of the chemical
products designed

into the defendants' iron with the degree of

accuracy

by

required

the

facts

of

this

case. To

relieve

the

defendants from the responsibility of fully answering plaintiff's
interrogatories is tantamount to requiring plaintiff to reinvent
exactly

all of

the sealants, coatings, insulations, and other

chemical products used in the iron, and she would have no assurance
that the end products would be identical to the ones actually used
11

in the culprit iron.

On the other hand defendants, in designing

the iron, had certain problems to solve, and they solved

those

problems by ultimately selecting the products they have used at the
twelve sites within the iron identified by plaintiff. In solving
those problems they also had to decide whether to "make or buy"
each component product. If they decided to make the product, then
they

would

have

had

to

specify

its

components

in

terms

of

scientific or trade names and procure the same. If they decided to
buy the product, then they had to purchase by specification and/or
they had to purchase by scientific, technical or trade name. If
they purchased from vendors they know, or should know, the names of
those vendors and the names of the products purchased there from.

5. Plaint iff'appellant never asked defendants/appellees
to "perform the plaintiff's testing" as alleged by defendants in
their brief at page 18.
The fact of the matter is that whether or not the
defendants should "perform the plaintiff's testing" is not now and
has never been an issue. What

testing would

they do? They

are

already fully versed in the manufacture of their iron. They know
the identities of all of the suspect chemical products in the iron.
A search of the record will reveal that the plaintiff has never
asked the defendants to do testing of any kind.

6. Plaintiff did not refuse to let defendants inspect
and/or test the culprit iron. Defendants' Brief, Pg. 21.
Contrary to defendants' assertion at page 21 of their
12

brief, plaintiff

did

not

refuse

to allow Black

and Decker

to

inspect the iron in question. Black and Decker, at the plaintiff's
home and through their

insurance company, inspected the culprit

iron , took notes of its identifying features and made photographs
of the culprit iron on or about 13 June 1988. What took place on
the occasion

to which defendants

refer

was

the

suggestion

by

defendants that they wanted the iron so they could perform tests
thereon.
To understand the problem involved with any testing
done on the iron, one must be aware that there is only one culprit
"The

Classic"

chemical

metal

products

steam

therein,

iron
and

with

its

one must

assembly

of

understand

suspect

that

such

testing one can do on the iron relevant to the problem of causation
is destructive of the evidence. Plaintiff, therefore, objected to
any testing by either party, which was not planned and coordinated
by the parties and the results shared by the parties,, R. 0161.
There was much exchange over this matter and Judge Moffat issued a
minute entry calling for plaintiff to turn over the iron, R. 0157,
but when all of the facts were made known to him, and after a
letter from counsel for defendants to Judge Moffat, R. 0174, and by
stipulation of the parties, the judge refrained from ever signing
an order requiring

plaintiff to turn the culprit

iron over

to

defendants. R. 0157; R. 0161; R. 0166; See also, R. 0338 at page 3,
Par 4; and R. 396 at page 8, pars a,b & c and Ex. 6.

13

7. With respect to defendants'/appe1 lees ' independant
medical examination of plaintiff.
Defendants accuse plaintiff of refusing to undergo
an independant medical examination, (defendants brief at Pg 21, mid
page). Plaintiff did not refuse to take an independant

medical

examination. What actually took place was that plaintiff objected
to taking the examination with anyone who had not been informed of
the chemicals in the iron, R. 0270. Once the court ruled she was
examined by Dr. Swinyer.

8.
With respect to sanctions
attorney, defendants' brief at page 21.

against

plaintiff's

See plaintiff's
memorandum
in opposition
to
Sanctions. R. 0338, at 339-345, and R. 345, last paragraph.
The occasion for sanctions would never have arisen
in the absence of the trial court's failure to issue an appealable
ruling
exempting
defendants
from
answering
plaintiff's
interrogatories fully.
B. THE SWINYER AFFIDAVIT DID NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 56(e), UTAH
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND THE FACTS AND DATA ON WHICH
HE STATED HE BASED HIS OPINION DO NOT MEET THE TEST OF
RULE 703, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE.
1. Dr. Swinyer clearly

lacked the personal

knowledge

required by Rule 56(e), URCP. See Appellant's principle brief at
pages 26-31.

The standard by which affidavits are judged for the

purpose of summary judgment: " • . , affidavits must include not
only

the

expert's

opinion,

but

also

the

logically support the experts conclusion."

specific

facts

that

"In so doing, we stress

the requirement that rule 56(e) requires specific facts." "A bare
assertion that the expert has reviewed the facts and based his or
14

her opinion on them will not suffice." Butterfield v. Okubo* 831
P.2d 97(Utah 1992), at 104,

middle of left col.)

2. Defendants' counsel has correctly quoted Rule 703,
Utah Rules of Evidence, but he has incorrectly applied it.
The

rule

states,

"The

facts

or

data

in

the

particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
particular

field

in

forming

opinions

or

inferences

in the

upon

the

subject . • "
No one, particularly the defendants, made known to
defendants' experts, and particularly to Dr. Swinyer prior to his
affidavit, the

names of

the

chemicals

in

the

iron,

the

very

information necessarily "reasonably relied upon by experts", in the
particular

field

of

analyzing

the migration

of

chemicals,

in

forming opinions or inferences upon the subject of causation in the
context of the relevant facts alleged by plaintiff/appe1lant•

3, All of the facts upon which Dr. Swinyer based his
opinion are not admissible in evidence to disprove causation in
this case.
a. In the absence of a knowledge of the offending
chemicals and the knowledge born of experiment, such facts as Dr.
Swinyer

revealed

as

the

basis

of

his

affidavit

opinion

are

inadequate to disprove causation and would therefore be excluded,
because their probative value is substantially outweighed by the
15

danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury . . . ", Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.
b. In the absence of a knowledge of the offending
chemicals,
expressed

the
in

facts
his

on which Dr.

affidavit

would

Swinyer
be

based

his

opinions

irrelevant

to

disprove

causation. Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence.

C.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED AS A
MATTER OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFF COULD NOT MEET HER BURDEN
OF PROVING CAUSATION.
1.

Plaintiff/appe1lant argues that defendants failed to

meet their initial twin burden of showing that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and of showing that they are entitled
to a summary judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. But, if they have met that initial burden:
a.

Rule 56(f) provides protection if a party who

has good grounds for opposing a motion for summary judgment

is

unable at the time of the hearing to present acceptable evidence
that there is a genuine issue of fact.

The rule states that:

"Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that he cannot, for reasons stated,
present by affidavit facts essential to justify his
opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment, or order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had,
or make such other order as is just."
Under proper circumstances, if the opposing party has no
means to meet successfully the facts alleged in the moving party's
affidavits,

summary

judgment

will
16

be denied.

U.S. v.

Gotham

Pharmacal Corporation, D.C.N.Y. 1941, 1 F.R.D. 744.

b.

A

plaintiff

opposing

a motion

for

summary

judgment is not required to file opposing affidavits but may stand
upon his pleadings provided that his allegations, if proved, would
establish a basis for recovery. Christensen ex.rel. Christensen v.
Financial Serv. Co., 14 Utah 2d 101, 675 P.2d 1170(Utah 1963. The
fact that party opposed to the motion for summary judgment fails to
submit documents in opposition does not preclude the denial of the
motion; where the party opposed submits no documents in opposition,
the

moving

party

may

be

granted

summary

judgment

only

if

appropriate, that is, he is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Olwell v. Clark 658 P.2d 585(Utah 1982)

Summary judgment

need not be affirmed merely because party opposing summary judgment
did

not

file

affidavits

in

order

him.Mountain States Tel. & Tel.

to

avoid

judgment

against

Co. v. Atkin, Wright and Miles,

Chartered, 681 P2d 1258(Utah 1984)
2, Defendants cite Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2nd 265(1986) for the proposition
that "a plaintiff must respond to a motion for summary judgment if
the defendant has brought

to the court's attention, by way of

affidavit or simply by reference to the record, that there is no
evidence concerning an element of the plaintiff's case upon which
the plaintiff bears the burden at trial.,f Defendants Brief, Pg. 15,
last 4 lines, and then conclude "that if plaintiff fails to present
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evidence, summary

judgment is appropriate/' Pg. 16, first

line.

Defendants ultimately apply their understanding to the present case
by stating that, "Black and Decker shifted the burden to Mrs. Davis
merely by informing the court

that none of Mrs. Davis' treating

physicians supported her theory." Defendants1 Brief, Pg. 21, last
ful1 sentence.
Defendant's initial burden is two fold.
claim

they

met

the

burden

by

informing

the

trial

Defendants
court

that

treating physicians do not support her theory (defendants' brief at
page 21, 3rd line from bottom). Such revelation, aside from not
being an accurate statement of the fact stated, did not meet the
movants' burden. Any simple reference to the record must be more
than an unsupported statement that the record shows no evidence
concerning a key element of plaintiff's burden. Such reference must
"show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Celotex, pg 2552, quoting rule 56(c). Having failed to meet moving
party's burden in both respects defendants were not entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of

law, irrespective of non-moving

party's response.
The

Supreme

Court,

in Celotex,

conditioned

its

ruling with the words^
"after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial." Celotex, Pg. 2552, Rt Col, Line 12.
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The record

in the instant case

is not devoid of

evidence supporting plaintiff's allegations of causation, including
probable cause.
Plaintiff/appe1lant argues that because of judicial
abuse of discretion and defendants' failure

to respond fully in

their answers to plaintiff's Interrogatories, Set Number 3, she has
not had "adequate time for discovery" and that in any event she has
made a showing sufficient to demonstrate that defendeints are not
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court, in Celotex, was envisioning a
situation where there was a "complete

failure of proof" as in

Celotex where the plaintiff had failed to establish that defendant
was

indeed

the

manufacturer

of

the

asbestos

which

caused

plaintiff's injuries. The facts in Celotex seem to indicate that
the essential fact, "to whose asbestos was the plaintiff in Celotex
exposed?" was indeterminable, so the essential fact of Celotex's
manufacture

of

the

injuring

asbestos

could

not

under

any

circumstance be proved. Such is not the situation in Davis v. Black
and Decker in which the issue of causation is not so clear cut, and
the manufacturer of the iron is known.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Celotex also said,
"We do not mean that the nonmoving party must produce
evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in
order to avoid summary judgment. Obviously, Rule 56 does
not require a nonmoving party to depose her own witnesses.
Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be
opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed
in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves, and it
is from this list that one would normally expect the
19

nonmoving party to make the showing
referred. " Celotex, Pg 2553, item 7.

to which we

have

3. Plaint i ff/appe 1 lant in the instant case is not a party
who has completely failed "to establish the existence of an element
essential

to that

party's

case". The

record

is not

devoid

of

evidence supporting her allegations of causation including probable
cause. For example the record of this case reveals the following
facts which serve to establish causation.
a.

Plaint iff/appe1lant has identified the culprit

iron to be "The Classic" metal steam iron in her Amended Complaint,
R. 0019, Par 2 , and by Affidavit. R. 0547, Par 2. Defendants
agree.
b. She has identified the manufacturer and the Utah
distributor of "The Classic" in Utah as the defendants. (Amended
Complaint, R. 020, Par 8.)
with the actual

Plaintiff can support her allegations

iron she claims injured her. It identifies the

defendants as the manufacturers, and defendants have not denied
that they manufacture and distribute "The Classic" metal steam iron
and

have

proceeded

in

this

case

as

though

they

were

the

manufacturers and distributors of the iron.
c. She has alleged and can verify by the testimony
of Dr. Darrell G. Hensleigh, M.D., specialist in internal medicine
and oncology,

who gave her a routine general physical examination,

on or about 22 May 1987, 7 months prior to the incident with the
culprit "The Classic" metal iron, and by the medical records he
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maintains, that her skin was free and clear of any dermatitis

on

that

of

occasion.

Defendants

have

the

medical

records

plaintiff/appe1lant maintained by Dr. Hensleigh, but do not mention
him in their arguments.
d. She has stated that she had been wearing the four
two year old blouses which were the first blouses she ironed with
her new "The Classic" steam iron without any skin problem prior to
the incident of which she complains. Amended Complaint, R. 0021,
Par 12; R. 0434-440, R. 0316 at 0317 4th par and 0318 1st par;
Deposition of 01 Eve Loomis Davis, R.
e. She has presented evidence, by way of affidavit,
that identifies some twelve sites within the culprit "The Classic"
metal steam iron at which products, essentially chemical in nature,
have been designed and used in the iron as integral parts of the
iron. Affidavit of Elmer T. Davis, Jr., R. 0221. This affidavit was
based

on personal

knowledge

gained

from dissassembling

a "The

Classic" metal steam iron that was similar to the culprit iron, and
the affidavit was submitted as an exhibit for the convenience of
the court to establish the existence of chemicals not identified by
defendants in their answers to plaintiff's interrogatories. Actual
proof to the jury of chemicals in the iron would come, in part,
from a dismantled

"The Classic" metal steam

iron in which each

juror could see the chemicals for him(her)se 1 f. Defendants have
admitted that chemicals have been incorporated into their iron by
their answers to plaintiff's

Interrogatories, Set Number 3, (R.

21

0683). and through defendants' counsel's letter to

Judge Moffatt,

(R. 0287, last two paragraphs on page). Defendants have admitted
that

there ar

e some

chemicals whose

identities

they have not

revealed to plaintiff.
f. Plaintiff/appellant has stated at R. 0317, 4th
par, and at R. 0318, 2nd par, and alleged in her amended complaint,
R. 0021, Par 12, and testified under oath that her injury occurred
at the time of her first use of defendants' iron when she ironed
four old blouses which she wore four consecutive days. Her skin
began to react soon after she put on the first blouse immediate 1}'
after she had ironed all four blouses.

Affidavit. R. 0547, at

Par 2.
g.

She has described her substantial injuries. R.

0021, Par's. 12,13; R. 313-315.
h. She has alleged in her Amended Complaint, R. 021,
Par 12, that the defective condition of defendants' iron was the
"proximate
product

cause"

of

plaintiff's

liability. R.

0022, Par

injuries

for

13. She has

the

purpose

similarly

of

alleged

"proximate cause" with respect to "negligent design", R. 0025, Par
20; "failure to warn", R. 0027, Par 28; "breach of warranty",
R. 0029, Par 36; and "negligence", R. 0031, Par 43.

Finally, she

has, in support of her allegation of proximate cause, described in
detail

a

mechanism

by

which

chemicals

from

defendants'

iron

migrated from the iron to plaintiff's clothing and then to her
skin. The mechanism she describes is amenable to scientific and
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technical proof once the identities of the chemicals in the iron
are made available.
i. After the incident, she visited and was seen by
Dr. Zone, Dr. Sotiriou, and Dr. Lieferman, all of whom confirmed
that her skin was indeed broken out and diagnosed her condition to
be contact dermatitis, a condition caused by substances coming in
contact with the skin. Deposition of Dr. Zone, Plaintiff's Brief,
Exhibit 8, Pg. 4, Ln. 10-12., Pg. 6, Lns. 1 & 2; Deposition of Dr.
Sotiriou, Exhibit 7, Page 6. Ln. 7 - 12, Page 57, Ln 22.
j. She testified that when she discovered that there
had been chemicals designed into the iron, she discontinued

its

use, that her skin stopped reacting and that her skin began to
heal. R. 547, Par, 3, That her skin had cleared up was confirmed in
defendants'

Dr.

Swinyers

report

of

his

examination

of

the

plaintiff. Affidavit of Dr. Swinyer. R. 0373, Par. 6.
k. The fact that

plainiff's skin has cleared

up

after discontinuing use of the iron puts to rest any suggestion
that plaintiff's condition is atopic eczema or T-cell lymphoma, and
it strongly

suggests

a relationship

between

the

iron

and

her

injuries .

4. Additionally, proximate cause is a factual issue that
generally cannot be resolved as a matter of law. Butterfield v.
Okubo, 831 P.2d at 106, rt, col., first full par.
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5.

Finally, The court in Butterfield, at 106, last four

lines rt. col,, had this to say,
" • • . , it is the provence of the jury to
resolve these factual disputes and to determine
whether the causation theory is fatally attenuated.
In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of the
fact that doubts about whether a nonmovant has
established a genuine issue of material fact should
be resolved in favor of permitting the party to go
to trial.''
6.

With consideration of the foregoing it is abundantly

clear that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that
plaintiff could not prove causation, which of necessity includes
probable cause, and erred in its conclusion that a summary judgment
was warranted in the instant case.

IX.

CONCLUSION:
1. Plaint iff/appellant has demonstrated that the trial

court, in its failure to make definite rulings on the adequacy of
defendants' answers to plaintiff's Interrogatories, Set Number 3,
in response to plaintiff's motions to compel deprived plaintiffs of
the opportunity to have the issues determined early in the course
of discovery in this case, has abused its judicial discretion and
thereby has deprived plaintiff of foundational facts known by, and
in the exclusive possession of, the defendants.
2. She has shown that the affidavit of Dr. Swinyer should
have been stricken, because of Dr. Swinyer's
knowledge

of

the very

facts

required

to

form

lack of

personal

an opinion with

respect to causation in this case. The trial court abused
24

its

judicial

discretion

affidavit in

when

it

failed

to

strike

Dr.

Swinyer's

support of defendants' summary judgment motion.

3. Finally she has demonstrated that there is a genuine
issue

of

causation

still

existing

in

this

case

which

should

ultimately go to a jury, and it was abuse of judicial discretion to
grant a Summary Judgment as a matter of law against plaintiffs.
4. WHEREFORE,
trial court abused

The Court of Appeals should rule that the

its judicial discretion with respect

to its

discovery rulings and that the trial court erred when it granted
Summary Judgment as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals should
reverse the Summary Judgment and return the case to the trial court
with

instructions

suggesting

that

the

trial

court

require

defendants to answer plaintiff's interrogatories fully by revealing
the

scientific

specifications

and/or
or

technical

the

names

names,
and

and

the

addresses

respective
of

the

manufacturers/suppliers, of the chemical products found in the iron
at the twelve sites identified by plaintiff. The chemical products
named in their answers should be keyed to those twelve sites.
X.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL:
Plaint iff/appellant respectfully requests the Court of

Appeals to reverse the Summary Judgment of the trial court, return
the case to the trial court for further discovery in accordance
with suggestions made herein as is appropriate.
Submitted this the 15th day of November'<1993.

4f^mer Thomas Davis, Jr.
/
torney for Plaint iff/App#llant
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